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Abstract 25 
Lack of self-control has been suggested to facilitate norm-transgressing behaviors because of 26 
the operation of automatic selfish impulses. Previous research, however, has shown that 27 
people having a high moral identity may not show such selfish impulses when their self-28 
control resources are depleted. In the present research, we extended this effect to prosocial 29 
behavior. Moreover, we investigated the role of power in the interaction between moral 30 
identity and self-control depletion. More specifically, we expected that power facilitates the 31 
externalization of internal states, which implies that for people who feel powerful, rather than 32 
powerless, depletion decreases prosocial behavior especially for those low in moral identity. 33 
A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study supported our predictions. The present 34 
finding that the interaction between self-control depletion and moral identity is contingent 35 
upon people’s level of power suggests that power may enable people to refrain from helping 36 
behavior. Moreover, the findings suggest that if organizations want to improve prosocial 37 
behaviors, it may be effective to situationally induce moral values in their employees.  38 
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Out of control!? How loss of self-control influences prosocial behavior: The role of 39 
power and moral values. 40 
Research suggests that in order to display prosocial and cooperative behaviors, people 41 
require active self-control to override their automatic selfish impulses [1]. This suggestion 42 
may have important implications in the context of work organizations because prosocial 43 
employee behaviors like voluntary helping one’s supervisor and coworkers, speaking up to 44 
improve the way in which work is organized, and attempting to offer the best customer 45 
service possible all play a significant role in effective organizational functioning [2,3]. 46 
However, a variety of forces that are known to hamper and deplete self-control are 47 
omnipresent in work situations, such as the necessity to make many choices and decisions [4], 48 
overly long working hours that lead to sleep deprivation [5,6], and stress [7]. In other words, a 49 
number of factors that seem inherent to organizational life may constrain prosocial employee 50 
behavior, and therefore organizational effectiveness. 51 
Yet, not everybody requires active self-control to display prosocial behavior. More 52 
specifically, people who have internalized moral values - as indexed by a high moral identity - 53 
may act in prosocial ways regardless of their level of self-control. This is an important 54 
theoretical idea because it presents a different perspective on the workings of automatic 55 
processes than most other studies, which usually assume that selfishness is automatically 56 
activated (e.g., [8-10]). However, internalized moral values have been argued to facilitate the 57 
self-regulation of moral behavior [11,12], which should explain why they can override 58 
automatic self-oriented processes. 59 
Unfortunately, there is as yet little empirical evidence to substantiate these arguments 60 
in the context of prosocial behavior. The present research therefore focuses on the interaction 61 
between internalized moral values and self-control depletion in predicting voluntary prosocial 62 
behaviors. Research on negative and antisocial behaviors has shown that the combination of 63 
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depletion and low moral identity increases antisocial behavior [13,14]. However, in the 64 
present paper we argue that selfishness by showing antisocial behavior is inherently different 65 
from selfishness by refraining from prosocial behavior. We argue that people need power to 66 
feel that they can refrain from helping others. People who feel powerful are more inclined to 67 
disregard others [15,16] and therefore more likely to deviate from prevailing norms [17]. We 68 
thus expect that power is likely to be a facilitator of the selfish state resulting from the 69 
combination of depletion and low moral identity.  70 
In the following sections, we will first develop our argument regarding the relevance 71 
of self-control for the display of voluntary prosocial behaviors and the role of internalized 72 
moral values in this process. We develop our reasoning using the influential strength model of 73 
self-control (see [18] for an overview). Internalized moral values are analyzed in terms of 74 
theorizing on moral identity [19-21]. Then, we will develop our argument regarding the 75 
critical moderating role of power in this process. This will result in a hypothesis regarding a 76 
three-way interaction effect of self-control, moral identity and employee power on voluntary 77 
prosocial behavior. 78 
Theoretical Background 79 
Self-Control, Depletion, and Prosocial Behavior 80 
Self-control refers to an individual’s ability to inhibit, override, or refrain from acting 81 
upon his/her impulses and desires [22-24]. The human capacity for self-control is extremely 82 
adaptive and enables people to follow society’s norms and rules [24,25]. In line with this, 83 
research has shown that self-control failures may lead to various behavioral problems that can 84 
be harmful to people and to social collectives, such as depression, aggression, the inability to 85 
manage finances, and theft. Conversely, successful self-control has been linked to numerous 86 
positive outcomes such as success at work, increased concentration, and an improved ability 87 
to cope with stress and problems (see [18] for an overview).  88 
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Research on self-control failures suggests that the capacity for self-control is a limited 89 
resource, which, with repeated use, can become depleted [26]. When self-control resources 90 
are depleted, performance on subsequent acts that require self-control may be impaired 91 
[18,26]. Self-control failures are thus more likely to emerge when an individual performs 92 
multiple acts that require self-control without rest or replenishment [26,27]. 93 
Importantly, the limited resource model of self-control may also have implications for 94 
our understanding of prosocial behavior. Specifically, it has been argued that displaying 95 
prosocial behavior and avoiding antisocial behavior requires self-control to override selfish 96 
impulses [1]. Indirect support for this idea is found in laboratory research that focuses on 97 
antisocial behavior showing that after an initial act that required self-control, people were 98 
more likely to cheat [9,13] and to act aggressively [28]. Research focusing on prosocial 99 
behavior, however, is scarce, if non-existent. We know of only one paper that addressed this 100 
issue but mostly in terms of prosocial intentions: DeWall and colleagues [1] showed that 101 
depletion reduced participants’ intention to help, but helping behavior was not included in the 102 
design. These findings suggest that people need self-control resources for prosocial behaviors 103 
to emerge. Interestingly, research suggests that having moral values (i.e., moral identity) 104 
facilitates the self-control of prosocial behavior [29]. That is, people with a high moral 105 
identity are more likely to have moral values readily accessible, even in situations that impair 106 
self-control. Below, we explicitly argue how moral identity may influence the self-regulation 107 
of prosocial behavior.  108 
Moral Identity 109 
Moral identity reflects the degree to which people consider being a moral person an 110 
important part of their self-concept [19,20]. Moral identity has been conceptualized as a 111 
cognitive representation or schema of moral values, goals, traits, and behavioral scripts 112 
[20,29]. For people high in moral identity, this moral self-schema is more readily accessible 113 
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and available for use than for people low in moral identity [20,30]. When activated, moral 114 
identity should have a strong influence on one’s cognition and behavior, as individuals have a 115 
strong tendency for self-consistency [19,31]. 116 
Consequently, moral identity is an important predictor of prosocial behavior [21] and 117 
has been associated with increased levels of self-reported volunteering [19], ethical leader 118 
behavior [32], an increased likelihood of making a donation [19,33], and charitable giving 119 
[34]. Additionally, moral identity has been linked to decreased levels of selfish behavior, such 120 
as less lying in business negotiations [20], lowered aggression on the football field [35], and 121 
less antisocial behavior among adolescents [36]. 122 
Important for the present purposes, moral identity may also facilitate the self-123 
regulation of prosocial behavior in situations that constrain the availability of self-regulatory 124 
resources (e.g., self-control depletion). As argued above, people with a high moral identity 125 
have more readily accessible moral values than people with a low moral identity [29]. 126 
Consequently, people with a high moral identity should be especially likely to expend extra 127 
effort to self-regulate their prosocial behaviors. Over time, people with a high moral identity 128 
will thus more frequently implement prosocial behavior, resulting in more internalized and 129 
automatic enactment of prosocial behavior [12]. People with a high moral identity are thus 130 
likely to have their moral values more readily available, even in situations in which their self-131 
control resources are depleted. We know of only two studies that offer some indirect support 132 
for this argument, but this support is offered in the realm of negative behavior. This research 133 
shows that depletion makes people low in moral identity more likely to show antisocial 134 
behavior, whereas this negative effect of depletion was absent among people high in moral 135 
identity [13,14]. In other words, the combination of depletion and a low level of moral 136 
identity represents a negative cocktail as evinced by the heightened levels of antisocial 137 
behavior. 138 
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However, findings obtained with negative behaviors cannot be straightforwardly 139 
extrapolated to (the non-display) of positive behavior. In philosophy, an important distinction 140 
is made between positive (i.e., do good for another) and negative duties (i.e., refraining from 141 
doing something morally bad; [37]). Importantly, Kant [38] argued that negative duties are 142 
more stringent than positive duties. In other words, refraining from negative behavior is 143 
considered more pressing than positive behavior, and therefore, negative behaviors are often 144 
regulated by state legislation [39]. Likewise, in organizations, refraining from antisocial and 145 
selfish behavior is regulated by formal sanction systems, whereas displaying prosocial 146 
behavior is often informal and more easy to implement because of its’ social desirability. 147 
Admittedly, the display of prosocial behavior might sometimes be restrained by, for example, 148 
formal organizational rules and regulations [40] or by the demands that are inherent in 149 
employees’ primary tasks [41]. However, helping others is often considered to be rewarding 150 
and these behaviors ‘feel good’ [42,43]. These behaviors are already stimulated at a young 151 
age [44]. Moreover, such behaviors are ‘the right thing to do’ and as such affirm one’s 152 
morality (see [45]). Thus, these behaviors are mostly regulated by informal norms rather than 153 
by explicit sanctioning systems.  154 
Variations in the display of antisocial and prosocial behavior can thus not be expected 155 
to be symmetrical. As such, selfishness by showing antisocial behavior is inherently different 156 
from selfishness by refraining from prosocial behavior. One can thus not straightforwardly 157 
extrapolate the effects of factors that influence the display of negative and antisocial 158 
behaviors toward the non-display of positive and prosocial behaviors. Hence, it remains to be 159 
seen whether the interaction effect between moral identity and depletion on antisocial 160 
behavior generalizes to the display of prosocial behavior. As we argue below, it is likely that 161 
power is a facilitator of the selfish state resulting from the combination of low moral identity 162 
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and depletion. In other words, it may be that people actually need power to feel that they can 163 
refrain from prosocial behavior. 164 
Power as an Inhibitor of Prosocial Behavior 165 
Power is typically defined as one’s ability to administer and deny valuable resources 166 
or punishment to other people (e.g., [15,46,47]). Power is a central aspect of organizational 167 
contexts [48,49], and as such, can have a substantial impact on the emergence of selfish 168 
behaviors. Specifically, power has often been viewed as a corruptive force, influencing people 169 
to behave in self-interested ways [15,50-52]. A number of empirical studies have indeed 170 
suggested that people who experience power tend to focus on selfish impulses and 171 
subordinate the needs of others to their own desires (for overviews, see [15,16]). Moreover, 172 
the experience of power makes people less likely to empathize with someone else [53,54]. 173 
People who experience power are also less influenced by others and less likely to conform to 174 
prevailing norms [17]. In sum, it seems that people who feel powerful are inclined to 175 
disregard others in their behavior.  176 
More recent research, however, suggests that the relation between power and self-177 
interested behavior may be more complex [15]. Rather than directly influencing behavior, 178 
power may instead amplify the behavioral expression of individual predispositions 179 
[48,51,55,56]. Wisse & Rus [57], for example, found that people who experienced power 180 
displayed more antisocial behavior when they focused on their personal self than when they 181 
focused on their social self.  182 
 The finding that power magnifies inherent impulses is interesting in the context of 183 
moral identity and self-control depletion. Because the combination of a low moral identity 184 
and self-control depletion has been reported to increase antisocial behavior and, as such, can 185 
be considered to represent a cocktail of selfishness, power should be expected to be a 186 
magnifying factor. As we argued before, it is not possible to simply translate results found in 187 
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the realm of negative behavior to positive behavior, and it therefore remains to be shown 188 
whether the combination of low moral identity and depletion leads to lower levels of prosocial 189 
behavior, or if power is a necessary facilitator of this effect. We expect the latter to be true for 190 
two reasons. First, prosocial behavior is usually displayed in high quality relationships such as 191 
workplace relationships. Power, however, may actually undermine this prevalence of 192 
prosocial behavior in high quality relationships. More specifically, power leads to an 193 
objectification of others, which transforms workplace relationships in exchange relationships, 194 
as such undermining prosocial behavior [56]. Second, while the display of positive behavior is 195 
enhanced by societal norms and education, high power undermines conformity [17], and 196 
therefore less helping behavior can be expected. In other words, people high in power may 197 
feel that they are in a position where they can get away with less helping behavior. 198 
For people high in moral identity, on the other hand, depletion does not influence their 199 
level of selfishness as research suggests that high moral identifiers have their moral values 200 
more readily accessible even in situations of self-control depletion [13,14]. Because prosocial 201 
behavior is easy to implement and generally sustained by societal and organizational norms, 202 
we expect that people high in moral identity act in line with these societal norms irrespective 203 
of their level of depletion. In the same vein, one could also reason that power, as a facilitator 204 
of individual predispositions, may increase the prosocial behavior of people high in moral 205 
identity. Indeed, there is some research that indicates that people high in power who focus on 206 
moral or prosocial values show less antisocial behavior than those low in power [48,57]. 207 
Prosocial behavior is -unlike antisocial behavior- relatively easy to implement and sustained 208 
by societal and organizational norms. We expect that because of this high social acceptance of 209 
most prosocial behaviors, power will not lead to more prosocial behavior for high moral 210 
identifiers. That is, we expect that prosocial behavior is already part of the daily routine for 211 
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people high in moral identity, and power is not likely to increase their helping behavior 212 
beyond this level.  213 
Overview of Predictions and Studies 214 
There is reason to believe that self-control depletion undermines the emergence of 215 
prosocial behaviors. However, internalized moral values in terms of a high moral identity 216 
facilitate the self-regulation of prosocial behavior, even in situations that impair self-217 
regulation. In other words, depletion is likely to make people low in moral identity less 218 
prosocial, whereas depletion should have no effect on people high in moral identity. In the 219 
present research we expect that - contrary to the negative effects of depletion and low moral 220 
identity on antisocial behavior - power is a facilitator of the negative combination of depletion 221 
and low moral identity on prosocial behavior. It is likely that people may need power to feel 222 
that they can get away with refraining from prosocial behavior. Hence, we expected that 223 
power facilitates the interaction effect of depletion and moral identity on prosocial behavior. 224 
This leads to our Hypothesis, which implies a three-way interaction between depletion, moral 225 
identity and power. In particular, when power levels are high, a combination of depletion and 226 
low moral identity lead people to refrain from prosocial behavior, whereas no such an effect is 227 
expected when power levels are low. The present study’s Hypothesis therefore states that: 228 
The negative effect of depletion on prosocial behavior among people low in moral 229 
identity is restricted to people high, rather than low in power. 230 
We tested this Hypothesis in two studies. Study 1 was a controlled laboratory 231 
experiment in which participants’ power and level of depletion were manipulated. We 232 
measured the participant’s level of moral identity independent from the experimental 233 
situation. The dependent variable in this study was the extent to which the participants helped 234 
another person who was in need.  235 
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The controlled setting in Study 1 makes it possible to draw causal conclusions, but it 236 
does not tell us much about the relevance of the processes that we set out to study in actual 237 
organizational contexts. Therefore, Study 2 was conducted in an organizational setting, using 238 
a multisource design. We asked employees of various organizations to indicate their level of 239 
depletion, their moral identity, and their power in the organization using well-established 240 
measures. To avoid potential common method and self-presentation biases [58] we asked a 241 
colleague to indicate the focal employee’s level of prosocial behavior. We operationalized 242 
prosocial behavior as organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). OCB is an important and 243 
commonly used index of prosocial employee behavior because it describes various types of 244 
discretionary, extra-role behaviors that contribute to effective organizational functioning but 245 
that are not explicitly required [59].  246 
Study 1 247 
Method 248 
Ethics statement. Ethics approval for Study 1 was formally waived by the ethical 249 
committee of the Faculty of Psychological and Educational Sciences (FPPW), Ghent 250 
University, as this research was performed in adherence with the ethical protocol of the 251 
university. All participants gave their formal, written consent, and were fully debriefed after 252 
the experiment. Participants participated voluntary and they could quit the experiment at any 253 
time without negative consequences. All data was analyzed and stored anonymously. 254 
Participants and design. Eighty-four undergraduate students1 from a medium-sized 255 
Belgian university participated in this study. The average age of participants was 18.95 years 256 
(SD = 2.11), and 89.3 percent were women. The participants were recruited through an online 257 
sign-up system and received partial course credit for their participation. Participants were 258 
randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high versus 259 
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low power) between subjects design. Participants’ moral identity was assessed prior to the 260 
experimental manipulations, creating an additional continuous between subjects variable. 261 
Moral identity measure. Participants responded to an online questionnaire including 262 
demographic information and a measure of moral identity 24 hours before the actual 263 
experiment. We used Aquino and Reed´s [19] instrument to measure participants’ moral 264 
identity. Following Aquino and Reed [19], and in line with our theoretical ideas, we relied on 265 
the Internalization dimension of this instrument (i.e., the extent to which people find morality 266 
an important aspect of who they are) and disregarded the Symbolization subscale (which 267 
measures the extent to which people want to appear as a moral person). The Internalization 268 
subscale has been proven to be the most stable and robust predictor of moral behavior [29,34]. 269 
In line with Aquino and Reed’s [19] procedure, the following instructions were given: “Listed 270 
below are some characteristics that might describe a person: Caring, Compassionate, Fair, 271 
Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, and Kind. The person with these 272 
characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your 273 
mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, 274 
feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the 275 
following questions.” Participants then responded to the five Internalization items on a 7-point 276 
scale. Sample items from this scale are: “It would make me feel good to be a person who has 277 
these characteristics” and “Having these characteristics is an important part of my sense of 278 
self” (1 = totally disagree; 7 = totally agree; Cronbach’s = .72; M = 6.18, SD = 0.60).  279 
Experimental procedure. Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated in 280 
separate cubicles, each equipped with a personal computer. All communication took place via 281 
this computer.  282 
First, participants were introduced to the power manipulation, taken from Galinsky 283 
and colleagues [51] that served to prime high versus low power. Participants were asked to 284 
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recall a particular situation in their lives. Participants in the high power condition wrote about 285 
“a particular situation in which you had power over another individual or individuals”. 286 
Participants in the low power condition wrote about “a particular situation in which someone 287 
else had power over you.”  288 
Following the power manipulation, participants responded to the manipulation checks 289 
using two items (adapted from [60]): “How powerful did you feel in the situation you 290 
recalled” and “How much power did someone else have over you in the situation you 291 
recalled” (reversed; 1 = not at all; 7 = very much so). 292 
Participants then completed the depletion task (taken from Baumeister et al., 1998). 293 
This task has proven to be successful as a manipulation of self-control depletion in a number 294 
of studies (e.g., [26,61,62]). In the first part, participants were instructed to indicate each 295 
instance of the letter e in a text (i.e., by clicking each e with the computer mouse). Participants 296 
received visual feedback whenever they clicked an e (i.e., a highlighted circle around the 297 
corresponding e), and were given five minutes to complete the task. This first phase is 298 
relatively easy and is used to establish a strong habitual response for scanning and indicating 299 
every e. In the second part of the task, participants either continued indicating e’s using the 300 
same rule as before (no depletion condition), or they were given the instruction to indicate 301 
each e, except for the ones followed by a vowel, or those with a vowel preceding the e by two 302 
letters (high depletion condition). For participants in the high depletion condition, overriding 303 
the response of scanning for and indicating every e is known to require more regulatory 304 
resources than for participants in the low depletion condition (who did not need to override a 305 
habitual response).  306 
The effectiveness of the self-control depletion manipulation was assessed using two 307 
items: “The second task was hard” (taken from [63]), and “The second task was habit-308 
breaking” (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so; taken from [1]).  309 
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Helping measure. After the experimental tasks, participants were told that there were 310 
several PhD students in need of participants for their experiments that lasted usually 311 
somewhere between 5 and 60 minutes. Participants were asked whether they would be willing 312 
to participate. We emphasized to the participants that it was not possible to reward them for 313 
their participation in these additional studies, and that they would be contacted by an 314 
experimenter to set a date and time that would suit them best. Then, participants indicated 315 
how much time they would help (i.e., number of donated minutes) or by indicating that they 316 
would not help (coded as 0 donated minutes; see e.g., [64,65] for similar ways to measure 317 
prosocial behavior). Subsequently, participants were fully debriefed.  318 
Results 319 
Manipulation checks. A 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high power versus low 320 
power) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed that participants in the high power condition 321 
considered themselves more powerful in the recalled situation than participants in the low 322 
power condition (M = 4.81, SD = 1.40 vs. M = 2.14, SD = 1.00, respectively), F(1, 80) = 323 
99.24, p < .001, 2 = .55. These participants also disagreed more with the statement that 324 
someone else had power over them than participants in the low power condition (M = 4.55, 325 
SD = 1.23 vs. M = 5.29, SD = 1.15, respectively), F(1, 80) = 8.17, p = .01, 2 = .09. No other 326 
main or interaction effects were significant. 327 
Additionally, two independent judges rated how powerful the participants were in the 328 
recalled situations on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all powerful; 7 = very powerful). The inter-329 
rater reliability was high (Intraclass correlation coefficient [ICC] = .90) and ratings were 330 
averaged to assess the effectiveness of the power manipulation. A 2 (depletion versus no 331 
depletion) x 2 (high versus low power) ANOVA showed that participants in the high power 332 
condition were rated more powerful in the described situation than participants in the low 333 
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power condition (M = 4.85, SD = 0.58 vs. M = 3.20, SD = 0.90, respectively), F(1, 80) = 334 
99.34, p < .001 , 2 = .55. No other main or interaction effects were significant. 335 
A 2 (depletion versus no depletion) x 2 (high versus low power) ANOVA indicated 336 
that depleted participants rated the depletion task as harder than non-depleted participants (M 337 
= 4.88, SD = 1.33 vs. M = 3.60, SD = 1.50, respectively), F(1, 80) = 17.62, p < .001, 2 = .18. 338 
These participants also found the task more habit-breaking than non-depleted participants (M 339 
= 5.05, SD = 1.38 vs. M = 3.95, SD = 1.46, respectively), F(1, 80) = 12.40, p = .001, 2 = .13. 340 
No other main or interaction effects were significant.2 341 
Helping behavior. Our measure of helping behavior (i.e., asking participants to 342 
donate their time for participation in additional studies) was positively skewed (M = 21.31, 343 
SD = 16.79). This resulted because a significant number of cases (N = 16) clustered at the 344 
lower limit (i.e., helping out for 0 minutes, to indicate that they did not want to display 345 
prosocial behavior). Skewed distributions can result in the violation of OLS assumptions. We 346 
therefore conducted a Tobit regression (see [66]), which was specifically developed for 347 
variables with a lower (or upper) limit and a concentration of observations at this limiting 348 
value.  349 
To test our hypothesis, we thus conducted a Tobit regression analysis3 in which 350 
helping behavior was predicted by the depletion manipulation, moral identity, the power 351 
manipulation, all the two-way interactions among these three variables, and finally, the three-352 
way interaction. Following Aiken and West [67], the interaction terms were based on the 353 
mean-centered scores of moral identity and effect coded scores of depletion and power. 354 
Table 1 shows the results of the Tobit regression analysis. Of most importance, the 355 
predicted three-way interaction was significant,  = .34, p = .004. To analyze this interaction 356 
in more detail, we used simple slope analyses [67]. Figure 1a shows that, consistent with our 357 
predictions, among participants who were primed with high power, depletion significantly 358 
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decreased helping behavior for those low in moral identity (one SD below the mean),  = -.55, 359 
p = .02, but not for those high in moral identity (one SD above the mean),  = .21, p = .33.  360 
Yet, for participants who received the low power prime (see Figure 1b), depletion did 361 
not significantly influence helping behavior for those low in moral identity (one SD below the 362 
mean),  = .35, p = .09, or for those high in moral identity (one SD above the mean),  = -.26, 363 
p = .24. 364 
Summary and Conclusion 365 
The results of Study 1 show that, in line with theoretical predictions [12] and our 366 
Hypothesis, among participants who felt high in power, depletion reduced prosocial behaviors 367 
for those low (as opposed to high) in moral identity, whereas this interaction effect between 368 
depletion and moral identity did not occur for those who felt low in power.  369 
Study 2 370 
Study 1 provided causal evidence for our proposed ideas, but the setup limited us to 371 
the use of students as participants in a laboratory setting. Study 2 was designed to test our 372 
predictions in an organizational setting. Rather than priming power and manipulating 373 
depletion, we measured employees’ sense of power in the organization and their level of 374 
depletion in addition to their moral identity. To avoid potential common method and self-375 
presentation biases we asked colleagues of the respondents to rate the respondent’s prosocial 376 
behavior [58]. 377 
Method 378 
Ethics statement. Ethics approval for Study 2 was formally waived by the ethical 379 
committee of the FPPW, Ghent University, as this research was performed in adherence with 380 
the ethical protocol of the university. We used a research agency to recruit our respondents, 381 
who gave their consent upon enrolling this research panel to use their data for research 382 
purposes. Moreover, a “double active opt-in” method was used, meaning that all respondents 383 
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gave their consent by actively and voluntarily agreeing to take part in our research. Before 384 
starting the questionnaire, all respondents were provided with information on the purpose and 385 
the content of the research. Respondents were informed that all data would be analyzed and 386 
stored anonymously and that they could quit the questionnaire at any moment. 387 
Sample and procedure. We recruited respondents via a Dutch research panel. We 388 
asked potential respondents to respond to our survey and also to invite a coworker to respond 389 
to some items. A total of 893 panel members agreed to fill out the questionnaire as focal 390 
employee and 94 of these focal employees also found a colleague willing to fill out the 391 
questionnaire. The focal employees (i.e., panel members) received credit points that would 392 
allow them to receive certain gifts (e.g., tickets for the movies). Colleagues participated in a 393 
lottery in which they could win an Ipad or one of five €20 gift certificates. Because we relied 394 
on colleague ratings of the focal employee’s behavior, the number of respondents included in 395 
our analyses consisted of 94 employees and 94 matched colleagues.4  396 
Of the focal employees, 55 were male and 39 were female. The mean age was 44.13 397 
years (SD = 11.37). One percent had only lower education (primary school), 17% had high 398 
school only, 26% had followed up on this with vocational education, 36% had a bachelor’s 399 
degree, and 20% had a master’s degree. The focal employees worked on average for 12.83 400 
years (SD = 10.80) in their current organization.  401 
The matched group of colleagues included 47 males and 47 females. The mean age 402 
was 42.96 years (SD = 10.98). One percent had only lower education (primary school), 19% 403 
had high school only, 30% had followed up on this with vocational education, 43% had a 404 
bachelor’s degree, and 7% had a master’s degree. The colleagues worked on average for 405 
10.72 years (SD = 9.27) in their current organization. 406 
18 
 
 
Measures. We measured moral identity using the same internalization subscale of the 407 
moral identity measure [19] as in Study 1 (1 = not at all; 5 = very much so; Cronbach’s = 408 
.77; M = 4.02, SD = 0.70).  409 
 To assess focal employees’ levels of depletion, we used the 2-item measure from 410 
Muraven and colleagues [27]. Focal employees indicated how much they agreed or disagreed 411 
with: “I often feel as if I have low energy,” and “I often feel as if things are taking a lot of 412 
effort” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s = .72; M = 2.29, SD = 0.93).  413 
Power of the focal employee was measured using the 8-item instrument developed by 414 
Anderson and Galinsky ([50]; see [68] for extensive validation evidence). Focal employees 415 
responded to items such as “Even if I voice them, my views have little sway in the 416 
organization” (reverse scored), and “If I want to, I get to make the decisions in the 417 
organization” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s = .77; M = 3.51, SD = 418 
0.89). 419 
We operationalized prosocial behavior of the focal employee using the 19-item OCB 420 
measure of Moorman and Blakely [69]. To assess OCB, colleagues of the focal employees 421 
were asked to rate the focal employees on actions such as “voluntarily helps new employees 422 
settle into the job,” “often motivates others to express their ideas and opinions”, “performs 423 
his/her job duties with extra-special care,” and “actively promotes the organization’s products 424 
and services to potential users” (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree; Cronbach’s = 425 
.91; M = 3.87, SD = 0.52). 426 
Results 427 
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations. Table 2 presents the means, standard 428 
deviations, and correlations between the Study 2 variables.  429 
Hypothesis test. To test our hypothesis, we conducted a hierarchical regression 430 
analysis with colleague ratings of OCB serving as the dependent variable. Age, gender, 431 
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tenure, and education level of the focal employees, and, age, gender, and education level of 432 
the colleagues were entered as control variables in the first step of the regression. Depletion, 433 
moral identity, and power were entered in the second step of the regression. The two-way 434 
interactions between depletion, moral identity, and power were entered in the third step of the 435 
regression. The three-way interaction was entered in the fourth step. Interaction terms were 436 
based on mean-centered scores of the independent variables [67].  437 
Table 3 shows the results of the hierarchical regression analysis. Of most importance 438 
and in line with our Hypothesis, the predicted three-way interaction was significant,  = .24, p 439 
= .02. We used simple slope analyses [67] to analyze this interaction further. Figure 2a shows 440 
that, among high power employees, depletion significantly decreased OCB for those low in 441 
moral identity (one SD below the mean),  = -.95, p < .001. However, for those high in moral 442 
identity (one SD above the mean) depletion did not decrease OCB,  = .17, p = .35.  443 
Figure 2b shows that, for low power employees, depletion had no effect on OCB for 444 
those low in moral identity (one SD below the mean),  = .02, p = .89. Unexpectedly, 445 
depletion increased OCB for those high in moral identity (one SD above the mean),  = .41, p 446 
= .050. However, given the fact that the interaction between moral identity and self-control 447 
depletion was not significant among employees low in power, and given that we did not 448 
obtain this result in Study 1, the results of this analysis should be interpreted with caution. 449 
Supplemental analyses. We followed Spector and Brannick’s [70] suggestion and 450 
repeated our analyses without the control variables as predictors in the equations. This 451 
analysis led to similar conclusions to those presented previously. Most importantly, the 452 
predicted three-way interaction was significant,  = .24, p = .02.  453 
Summary and Conclusion 454 
The results of Study 2 supported our prediction. We found the hypothesized 455 
interaction between moral identity and depletion for employees high in power, but not for 456 
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employees low in power. More specifically, depletion reduces prosocial behaviors among 457 
employees low in moral identity if those employees feel high in power, but not if they feel 458 
low in power. The prosocial behavior of employees high in moral identity, on the other hand, 459 
was not influenced by depletion, whether they felt high in power or not. It thus seems that 460 
employees with a high moral identity have their moral values more readily accessible, even 461 
when their self-control resources are depleted and irrespective of their power level. 462 
General Discussion 463 
A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study consistently showed an 464 
interaction between depletion and moral identity for people high in power, but not for people 465 
low in power. In the following sections we discuss the implications and limitations of these 466 
findings. 467 
Theoretical Implications 468 
The obtained three way interaction between self-control depletion, moral identity and 469 
power has theoretical implications for each of the constituting factors of this third order effect. 470 
It enhances, first of all, our understanding of the role of self-regulation in the display of 471 
prosocial behavior. In fact, most previous studies focused on effects of depletion on 472 
subsequent task persistence or negative and antisocial behavior [13,28,71]. To date, indirect 473 
evidence for the effect of depletion on prosocial behavior is offered only by DeWall and 474 
colleagues [1] who showed that depletion decreases prosocial intentions. Hence, our research 475 
is (at least to our knowledge) the first to show that regulatory depletion has an effect on 476 
prosocial behavior. These findings are important because our results indicate that especially 477 
people who feel powerful and are low in moral identity are likely to show less prosocial 478 
behavior as a result of regulatory depletion. At the same time, however, people high in power 479 
are likely to serve as a source of ethical guidance by means of social learning [72,73]. That is, 480 
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if  someone in power does not act in ethical ways, employees are likely to follow his or her 481 
lead [74].  482 
Most importantly, the present findings offer corroborative evidence for the idea that 483 
the effect of situations that constrain cognitive capacity (e.g., self-control depletion) on 484 
prosocial behavior depends not only on one’s level of moral identity, but also on one’s sense 485 
of power. That is, self-control depletion leads to a decrease in prosocial behavior among 486 
people low in moral identity, but only when they feel powerful. Our reasoning for this is that 487 
prosocial behavior is fairly easy to implement because of its social desirability and it thus 488 
seems that people need power to feel that they can refrain from prosocial behavior. Research 489 
in the realm of antisocial behavior, however, has shown that the effect of self-control 490 
depletion on antisocial behavior depends solely on one’s level of moral identity [13,14]. That 491 
is, depletion increases antisocial behavior among people low in moral identity, irrespective of 492 
their power level. The self-regulation of prosocial behavior, on the other hand, is dependent 493 
upon people’s level of power. In other words, depletion reduces prosocial behavior among 494 
people low in moral identity, only if they experience power. Taking all these results together, 495 
it is clear that the display of prosocial intentions relies on processes that are qualitatively 496 
different from suppressing antisocial and selfish impulses (e.g., [75]).  497 
The results of the present study also have implications for our understanding of what 498 
power tells us about the differences between not helping someone and hurting someone. In the 499 
introduction we argued that refraining from antisocial behavior is considered as more pressing 500 
than prosocial behavior [38]. That is, antisocial behavior is usually regulated by formal 501 
sanctioning systems, which are known to make people focus on the exchange characteristics 502 
of a situation [76,77]. Similarly, power is also likely to make people focus on the exchange 503 
characteristics of a situation, because people who experience power tend to objectify others 504 
[56]. It thus seems that similar processes that underlie the emergence of antisocial behavior, 505 
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also play a role in the behavior of people high in power. Prosocial behavior, on the other 506 
hand, is regulated more informally because of its social desirability. Prosocial behavior is 507 
generally sustained by social and organizational norms, and adherence to these norms is fairly 508 
easy. The present study thus indicates that power is needed to obtain the same results for 509 
prosocial behavior as for antisocial behavior (i.e., the negative effect of self-control depletion 510 
for people low in moral identity; see [13,14]). 511 
 Our findings are also informative for the study of moral identity. Among people high 512 
in moral identity, self-control depletion and power do not necessarily hamper the self-513 
regulation of prosocial behavior. This finding suggests that, in line with Gino and colleagues 514 
[13] and Joosten and colleagues [14], people high in moral identity have their moral values 515 
accessible irrespective of their level of depletion.  516 
Our research has also some implications that are relevant for the power literature. Past 517 
research has, on the one hand, often shown that power can make people more selfish (for 518 
overviews see [15,16]). However, on the other hand, some studies suggest that this 519 
undermining effect on selfishness does not necessary result from having high power in itself 520 
[15,51]. As a solution to these diverging findings, it has been proposed that power in itself 521 
does not make people selfish but that it acts as a catalyst in facilitating the behavioral 522 
expression of internal states [60,78]. This indicates that power is not inherently corruptive, but 523 
rather a facilitator of the behavioral expression of internal states (in our case: the toxic 524 
cocktail of depletion and low moral identity). The present research adds to this literature, 525 
showing that the facilitating effect of power on internal states (i.e., low moral identity) is 526 
contingent upon third variables as well (i.e., self-control depletion).  527 
Practical Implications 528 
The present research also offers some practical implications for organizations. It seems 529 
to be the case that particularly employees who feel powerful are vulnerable to the effects of 530 
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self-control depletion on prosocial behaviors. At the same time, it is especially important for 531 
employees high in power to behave in prosocial ways as they form an important source of 532 
vicarious learning [73]. For these employees, the negative effects of self-control depletion on 533 
prosocial behavior seem to apply particularly among those low in moral identity. Fortunately, 534 
research indicates that it is possible to situationally increase the accessibility of moral identity 535 
[29,79]. Combined with the present results, this entails a promising implication for 536 
organizations. Situational interventions aimed at stimulating moral identity are thus likely to 537 
make employees who feel high in power behave in prosocial ways. Such interventions can 538 
consist of the stimulation of a clear ethical climate. Moreover, social learning is enforced by 539 
ensuring that employees high in power act in moral ways, by which interventions aimed at 540 
increasing morality have positive implications for people low in power [74,80,81].  541 
Another practical implication of the present findings is that on the one hand, high 542 
power makes employees particularly vulnerable to the effects of self-control depletion on 543 
prosocial behaviors, while, on the other hand, power also comes with heavy workloads, and 544 
numerous choices and decisions each day. Importantly, high stress levels [7], overly long 545 
working hours that may lead to sleep deprivation [5,6], and the necessity to make many 546 
choices and decisions [4], all constitute factors that are known to lead to self-control 547 
depletion. Organizations should thus be aware that overloading their employees in this respect 548 
could also reduce the prevalence of prosocial behaviors, at least among employees with a low 549 
moral identity and a high sense of power. Similarly, employees who feel high in power should 550 
also be aware that their cognitive state could affect their own behavior. 551 
One could assume from our results that employees who feel low in power are not 552 
vulnerable to the effects of self-control depletion on selfish behaviors. It is, however, 553 
important that organizations and employees realize that this only holds for the emergence of 554 
prosocial behaviors. That is, our findings indicate that for employees low in power, depletion 555 
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does not reduce prosocial behaviors for those low in moral identity. There are, however, 556 
studies in the realm of negative behavior that show that self-control depletion makes people 557 
low in moral identity more likely to show antisocial behavior [13,14]. Even though these 558 
studies did not compare high and low power, the results from these studies should 559 
nevertheless be taken into consideration.  560 
Strengths, Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 561 
A major strength of this article lies in the use of diverse methods to test our 562 
hypothesis. The laboratory experiment (Study 1) permits us to draw causal inferences with 563 
regard to the interactive effects of power, self-control depletion and moral identity on 564 
prosocial behavior. The subsequent multisource field study (Study 2) allowed us to investigate 565 
whether the hypothesized effects are also relevant in organizational settings. Furthermore, the 566 
multisource setting made it possible to control for common method and self-presentation 567 
biases [58].  568 
A potential limitation is that the sample sizes in both Study 1 and Study 2 are 569 
relatively small and that this could potentially harm the validity of our results. We did, 570 
however, replicate the findings in an experimental setting (Study 1) and in a multisource field 571 
setting (Study 2), which reinforces the reliability and validity of our results. However, even 572 
though we believe that our results are valid and reliable, replications are necessary to further 573 
prove the validity of our findings. 574 
In Study 2, we relied on colleague ratings of OCB. Our reliance on a single source to 575 
measure OCB may pose a threat to the validity of our findings, because of the discretionary 576 
nature of OCB [82]. That is, OCB consists of many different behaviors, and it is not unlikely 577 
that the colleagues witnessed only part of these behaviors. It may thus be that our reliance on 578 
a single source measure does not fully capture the unique variance present in citizenship 579 
behaviors. Future research could address this possible shortcoming by measuring OCB via 580 
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various sources (e.g., comparing self and other ratings, or by combining various other 581 
ratings). 582 
Another strength of the present article is that self-control depletion was manipulated in 583 
Study 1, whereas it was measured in Study 2. Although it can be argued that the manipulation 584 
of self-control depletion represents a more dynamic representation of self-control depletion 585 
than the more trait oriented measure, similar results were obtained. This apparent consistency 586 
strengthens our beliefs that it is possible to capture self-control depletion with a trait oriented 587 
measure in the field. These results also corroborate previous research that combined self-588 
control depletion manipulations and measures, which shows clear consistency between these 589 
two operationalizations of self-control depletion [4,14] 590 
Readers could wonder whether there are situations in which power may increase the 591 
prosocial behavior of people high in moral identity. In our research we focused on informal, 592 
effortless helping behavior. As noted in the introduction, prosocial behavior might sometimes 593 
be restrained by organizational rules and regulations or by demands inherent in employees’ 594 
primary tasks [40,41]. In these cases, prosocial behavior is thus likely to be more effortful and 595 
less socially desirable, and may have as a result that high moral identifiers need power to act 596 
in line with their moral values.  597 
Concluding Remarks 598 
Research focusing on the social effects of depletion presents us with a rather cynical 599 
view of human nature. Lack of self-control results in selfishness [8-10], and is also likely to 600 
undermine the emergence of prosocial behaviors. Yet, other studies show that depletion 601 
makes only people low in moral identity more selfish, while no such an effect of depletion 602 
was obtained among high moral identifiers. We argued that one cannot simply extrapolate the 603 
effects of factors that influence the display of antisocial behavior to the non-display of 604 
prosocial behavior, and that one may need power to refrain from prosocial behavior. In line 605 
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with this, we showed that the moderating role of moral identity on the effects of depletion is 606 
present among people high in power, and not among people low in power.   607 
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Footnotes 809 
     1 Three respondents were not included in the analyses because they did not follow the 810 
instructions of the power manipulation. Inclusion of these three respondents in our analyses 811 
did not change any of the results. Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction 812 
remained significant,  = .29, p = .01. 813 
     2 We also conducted regression analyses in which the manipulation checks were predicted 814 
by the depletion manipulation, power manipulation, participants’ moral identity, and the 815 
corresponding interaction terms. These analyses produced similar results to those presented in 816 
the main text. Specifically, power increased how powerful participants felt,  = .75, p < .001, 817 
and decreased reported feelings of powerlessness,  = -.30, p = .01. Furthermore, participants 818 
in the high power condition were rated significantly more powerful than participants in the 819 
low power condition,  = .83, p < .001. Finally, depletion increased ratings of how hard,  = 820 
.43, p < .001, and habit-breaking the task was,  = .35, p = .001. In none of the analyses, other 821 
main or interaction effects were significant. 822 
     3 We also conducted OLS regression analyses. These analyses produced similar results as 823 
the Tobit regression analyses. Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction was 824 
significant,  = .28, p = .02.  825 
     4 Focal employees who could be included in the analyses (i.e., because they had a 826 
coworker who was also willing to participate) did not differ from focal employees who could 827 
not be included in the analyses with regard to their mean level on the demographic variables 828 
and focal predictors. There was one exception: focal employees who could be included 829 
worked longer in their current organization than focal employees who were not included. This 830 
is most likely because longer tenure increases the likelihood of developing social connections 831 
with colleagues. This should make it easier to find a coworker willing to participate.  832 
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In addition, we also tested whether the correlations between the study variables were 833 
significantly different between included and not included employees. The correlations 834 
between the study’s variables (Bonferroni corrected) did not differ between the two groups of 835 
focal employees. These analyses give us little reason to think that selection biases impacted 836 
our results and conclusions.   837 
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Figure 1a. Helping as a function of depletion and moral identity for participants high in 838 
power. 839 
 840 
Figure 1b. Helping as a function of depletion and moral identity for participants low in power. 841 
 842 
Figure 2a. OCB (coworker rating) as a function of depletion and moral identity for high 843 
power employees. 844 
 845 
Figure 2b. OCB (coworker rating) as a function of depletion and moral identity for low power 846 
employees.  847 
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Table 1 848 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Helping in Study 1 849 
Variables B SE B 
Self-control depletion (SD) -1.26 2.11 -.06 
Moral identity (MI) 5.24 3.90 .15 
Power (P) -0.34 2.11 -.02 
SD x MI 1.24 3.90 .04 
SD x P -2.14 2.11 -.11 
MI x P 3.66 3.90 .11 
SD x MI x P 11.55 3.92 .34** 
Note. Final model: -2 log likelihood = -311.39, 2 (7) = 11.29, p = .13. B = unstandardized 850 
regression coefficient;  = standardized regression coefficient. For the self-control depletion 851 
manipulation, -1 denotes no self-control depletion; 1 denotes self-control depletion. For the 852 
power manipulation, -1 denotes low power; 1 denotes high power. 853 
 * p < .05. ** p < .01.   854 
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Table 2 855 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations of Study 2 Measures 856 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Self-control depletion 2.29 0.93 (.72)          
2. Moral identity 4.02 0.70 -.19 (.77)         
3. Power 3.51 0.77 -.23* .30** (.89)        
4. OCB (colleague rating) 3.87 0.52 -.19 .36** .27** (.91)       
5. Age (focal) 44.13 11.37 -.22* -.15 -.03 -.04       
6. Gender (focal) 1.41 0.50 -.05 .13 .15 .20 .04      
7. Tenure (focal) 12.83 10.80 -.11 -.14 -.09 .01 .66** -.03     
8. Education level (focal) 3.57 1.03 -.05 .25* .18 .09 -.12 -.09 -.13    
9. Age (colleague) 42.96 10.98 -.12 -.17 .00 -.18 .32** .06 .11 -.19   
10. Gender (colleague) 1.50 0.50 -.20 .29** .14 .27** -.12 .67** -.13 .10 -.19  
11. Education level (colleague) 3.36 0.91 -.08 .27** .31** .07 -.04 -.15 .03 .64** -.22* .05 
Note. N = 94. Internal reliabilities (coefficient alphas) are provided in parentheses on the diagonal. For gender, 1 denotes males, 2 denotes 857 
females. 858 
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01.859 
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Table 3 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for OCB in Study 2 
Variables Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Age of focal employee -.03 -.05 -.09 -.08 
Gender of focal employee .10 .09 .07 .07 
Tenure of focal employee .08 .12 .16 .15 
Education level of focal employee .06 .06 .07 .06 
Age of colleague -.14 -.16 -.12 -.10 
Gender of colleague .17 .07 .08 .11 
Education level of colleague .00 -.13 -.06 -.07 
Self-control depletion (SD)  -.10 -.04 -.09 
Moral identity (MI)  .26 .22*  .23* 
Power  .19 .16 .15 
SD x MI   .33** .41*** 
SD x Power   -.29** -.31** 
MI x Power   -.03 .05 
SD x MI x Power    .25* 
R2 .10 .23 .34 .38 
R2adj .03 .13 .23 .27 
R2change .10 .13** .11** .04* 
F 1.35 2.42* 3.14** 3.45*** 
Note. Table presents Beta coefficients. For gender, -1 denotes males, 1 denotes females.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
